

DERRIDA AND ART (APPRECIATION)

Jamia Millia Islamia

19 March – 26 March

19 March

FROM...

Deconstruction: *appreciating* language

... TO

deconstructing appreciation and *art appreciation*

Appreciating Derrida?

A WARNING

fields +

scope +

concept(s) +

seeing +

and +

time

(before, during,

and elasticity and briefness)

= madness

Deconstruction

Reading


Of Grammatology

Critique

Appreciation

The contradictory aspect of the term [deconstruction] is naturally intentional: *deconstruction*, is at once “destruction” and “construction”. The thing seems impossible; however, familiar examples of simultaneous “destruction-construction” are not lacking. The simplest is without a doubt that of cutting up (*découpage*), or of re-cutting up. When we “cut up” an electoral constituency to redefine its borders, when we cut a piece of cloth to make another one, we accomplish simultaneously the destruction of the old piece and the construction of the new one. *Deconstruction* could thus be first defined as the application of this logic of the “constituting cutting up” to the reading and the interpretation of philosophical and literary texts (but also ... juridical, political, administrative, etc.). It is the idea, finally simple and natural, that the sense of a text always results from an intervention. Reading, it is cutting up. Showing this new cutting up, it is writing. *Deconstruction* is thus not a theory, but a practice of reading (and thus of writing) through structuring cutting-ups.

Charles Ramond, Le Vocabulaire de Jacques Derrida



The Sign (Saussure)

However, Saussure went, in Derrida's view, insufficiently far in the exiting from the metaphysical frame. Worse, "he could not, not confirm this metaphysical tradition, inasmuch he continued using the concept of 'sign' " (*Positions*). The mistake of Saussure is not so much of having re-employed the word "sign" but of having conceived it as the association of a "signified" (the "concept") and of a "signifier" ("the acoustic image"), thus bringing back the essential oppositions that structure metaphysics, starting with the difference between the intelligible and the sensible. This way, one is less surprised by the constant di-valorisation which the *Cours* [the *Lessons*: Saussure's main text] applies to writing (...). Sound (speech, voice, orality) is indeed the determining element of the Saussurian theory of the linguistic sign: the signifier is an "acoustic image", that is to say the phantom of a vocal emission, just like what one gets when reciting a text mentally. And this "acoustic image" is homogenous with the "signified" inasmuch it is psychic, or mental, like the latter. The characteristic traits of metaphysics (primacy of the psychic, of sound, of voice, of presence) are thus conserved in the linguistics of Saussure, which may explain the brutality with which Derrida declares that *grammatology* will first have the effect of "destroying the concept of "sign" and all its logic" (*Of Grammatology*).

Charles Ramond, *Le Vocabulaire de Jacques Derrida*

If it seems to us in principle impossible to separate, through interpretation or commentary, the signified from the signifier, and thus to destroy writing by the writing that is yet reading, **we nevertheless believe that this impossibility is historically articulated.** It does not limit attempts at deciphering in the same way, to the same degree, and according to the same rules. Here we must take into account the history of the text in general. When we speak of the writer and of the encompassing power of the lan-

guage to which he is subject, we are not only thinking of the writer in literature. The philosopher, the chronicler, the theoretician in general, and at the limit everyone writing, is thus taken by surprise. **But, in each case, the person writing is inscribed in a determined textual system.** Even if there is never a pure signified, there are different relationships as to that which, from the signifier, *is presented* as the irreducible stratum of the signified. **For example, the philosophical text, although it is in fact always written, includes, precisely as its philosophical specificity, the project of effacing itself in the face of the signified content which it transports and in general teaches.** Reading should be aware of this project, even if, in the last analysis, it intends to expose the project's failure. The entire history of texts, and within it the history of literary forms in the West, should be studied from this point of view. With the exception of a thrust or a point of resistance which has only been very lately recognized as such, literary writing has, almost always and almost everywhere, according to some fashions and across very diverse ages, lent itself to this ***transcendent reading***, in that search for the signified which we here put in question, not to annul it but to understand it within a system to which such a reading is blind. Philosophical literature is only one example within this history but it is among the most significant. And it interests us particularly in Rousseau's case.

Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*

It can thus be seen that deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a *critique*. A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws or imperfections. It is not a set of criticisms designed to make the system better. It is an analysis that focuses on the grounds of that system's possibility. The critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself. For example, Copernicus can be said to have written a critique of the Ptolemeic conception of the universe. But the idea that the earth goes around the sun is not an *improvement* of the idea that the sun goes around the earth. It is a shift in perspective which literally makes the ground move. It is a deconstruction of the validity of the commonsense perception of the obvious. In the same way, Marx's critique of political economy is not an improvement in it but a demonstration that the theory which starts with the commodity as the basic unit of economy is blind to what *produces* the commodity—namely, labor. Every theory starts somewhere; every critique exposes what that starting point conceals, and thereby displaces all the ideas that follow from it. The critique does not ask "what does this statement *mean*?" but "where is it being made from? What does it presuppose? Are its presuppositions compatible with, independent of, and anterior to the statement that seems to follow from them, or do they already follow from it, contradict it, or stand in a relation of mutual dependence such that neither can exist without positing that the other is prior to it?"

Barbara Johnson, "Translator's Introduction",
Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*

LILA ... has evolved *Life Appreciation* as an inter-active process involving the Innovativeness of the individual vis-à-vis her past, present and future. It demands and engages with the intuitive, creative and intellectual faculties of the individual, and generates in her a magical sense of living. As a philosophical strain, it motivates every individual to live with a deep sense of gratitude to the many invisible forces – ideas, actions, inventions – that have facilitated her access to her current context and its rewards. Rather than choosing to follow the merely congratulatory association of *appreciation*, we locate the term within our nuanced acknowledgement of the human genius that imaginatively interconnects thoughts, experiences and expressions. This viewpoint has helped us work out an equitable methodology for society-building, wherein the creative co-existence of apparent opposites is made possible. Urging her to explore and act beyond the roles of a passive observer, critic or beneficiary, this process turns the individual into an active seeker, the creator of her own living. However, as she understands her life vis-à-vis the great march of humanity, she is saved the burden of attachment to both her knowledge and her contribution to society. ...

LILA Foundation, "Vision Manifesto"

26 March

FROM...

deconstructing language

... TO

Deconstruction:
appreciating traces, creations and art

WHAT IS THIS?

lecture?

conference?

talk?

reading

observing

deconstruction

writing

Derrida writes

space

from word to art

traces

arch-writing

deconstruction and art

The contradictory aspect of the term [deconstruction] is naturally intentional: *deconstruction*, is at once “destruction” and “construction”. The thing seems impossible; however, familiar examples of simultaneous “destruction-construction” are not lacking. The simplest is without a doubt that of cutting up (*découpage*), or of re-cutting up. When we “cut out” an electoral constituency to redefine its borders, when we cut a piece of cloth to make another one, we accomplish simultaneously the destruction of the old piece and the construction of the new one. *Deconstruction* could thus be first defined as the application of this logic of the “constituting cutting up” to the reading and the interpretation of philosophical and literary texts (but also ... juridical, political, administrative, etc.). It is the idea, finally simple and natural, that the sense of a text always results from an intervention. Reading, it is cutting up. Showing this new cutting up, it is writing. *Deconstruction* is thus not a theory, but a practice of reading (and thus of writing) through structuring cutting-ups.

Charles Ramond, *Le Vocabulaire de Jacques Derrida*

... when I write, the most difficult thing, what causes me the most anguish, mostly in the beginning, is to find the right tone. Ultimately, my most serious problem is not deciding what I want to say. Each time I begin a text, the anguish, the sense of failure, comes from the fact that I am unable to establish a voice. I ask myself whom I am talking to, how I am going to play with the tone, the tone being precisely that which informs and establishes the relation. It isn't the content, it's the tone, and since the tone is never present to itself, it is always written differentially; the question is always this differentiability of tone. Within each note there is a differential, but when one writes a text designed to last, whether it be a discursive text, a cinematic text, or whatever, the question is one of tone, of changes in tone. So I imagine that when I write I settle my problems of tone by looking for an economy – I can't find another word – an economy that consists in always pluralizing the tone, in writing in many tones, so as not to allow myself to be confined to a single interlocutor or a single moment.

Jacques Derrida, "The Spatial Arts"
(interview with Peter Brunette and David Wills)

And since you are asking about my texts, I would say that what they have in the final analysis that is most analogous to spatial, architectural, and theatrical works is their acoustics and their voices. I have written many texts with several voices, and in them the spacing is visible. There are several people speaking, and this necessarily implies a dispersion of voices, of tones that space themselves, that automatically spatialize themselves. ... All of a sudden, the person changes, the voice changes, and it all gets spacialized. People's reactions, their libidinal investments, positive or negative, their rejection or hatred, can probably be best explained in terms of tone and voice more than in terms of the content of what I actually say. They can put up with the fact that I take this or that position, but what really upsets them is this spacialization, the fact that one no longer knows whom one is dealing with, who signs, how it all comes together [*se rassemble*]; that is what disturbs them, what scares them. And this effect of spacialization – in my texts as well as in other texts – sometimes scares them even more than do spatial works themselves, because even spatial works that should produce this effect still give the impression of a kind of gathering [*rassemblement*]. We can say the work is there, it's a terrible thing, it's unbearable, it's menacing, but in fact it's within a frame, or it's made of stone, or it's in a film that begins and ends; there is simulacrum of gathering and thus the possibility of mastery, the possibility of protection for spectator or addressee. But there are types of texts which don't end and begin, or disperse their voices, which say different things, and which as a result hinder this gathering. One can listen but can't manage to objectify the thing. So, with my work, there are those who like it and those who don't. But I think that it is always a question of space, of the nonmastery of spacing, and not only of the voice or something in the voices.

Jacques Derrida, "The Spatial Arts"
(interview with Peter Brunette and David Wills)

Deux passages très déterminés, partiels, particuliers, deux exemples. Mais de l'essence l'exemple se joue peut-être.

Premier passage : la religion des fleurs. Dans la *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, le développement de la religion naturelle a comme toujours la forme d'un syllogisme : le moment médiate, « la plante et l'animal », comporte une religion des fleurs. Celle-ci n'est pas même un moment, une station. Elle s'épuise presque dans un passage (*Übergehen*), un mouvement évanouissant, l'effluve flottant au-dessus d'une procession, la marche de l'innocence à la culpabilité. La religion des fleurs serait innocente, la religion des animaux coupable. La religion des fleurs (l'exemple factuel) en viendrait d'Afrique, mais surtout de l'Inde ne reste pas, ou à peine, elle procède à sa propre mise en culpabilité, à sa propre animalisation, au devenir coupable et donc sérieux de l'innocence. Et cela dans la mesure où le même, le soi-même (*Selbst*) n'y a pas encore lieu, ne se donne, encore, que (dans) sa représentation (*Vorstellung*), « L'innocence de la religion des fleurs, qui est seulement représentation de soi-même sans le soi-même, passe dans le sérieux de la vie agonistique, dans la culpabilité de la religion des animaux; la quiétude et l'impuissance de l'individualité contemplative passe dans l'être-pour-soi destructeur. »

« Die Urschuld der Blumenreligion, die nur selbstlose Vorstellung des Selbst ist, geht in den Ernst des kämpfenden Lebens, in die Schuld der Tierreligion, die Ruhe und Ohnmacht der anwachsenden Individualität in das zerstörende Fortschreiten über. »

la culpabilité de la religion des animaux; la quiétude et l'impuissance de l'individualité contemplative passe dans l'être-pour-soi destructeur. »

toujours regarder de côté vers l'Inde pour suivre ce passage énigmatique, qui passe très mal, entre l'Extrême-Occident et l'Extrême-Orient. L'Inde, ni l'Europe ni la Chine. Sorte de goulot d'étranglement historique. Reparré comme Gibraltar, « roc stérile et dépendant », colonnes d'Hercule dont l'histoire appartient à celle de la route des Indes. En ce détroit un peu touché, le panorama est-ouest eurafrique se rétrécit infiniment. Point de devenir. La pointe rocheuse a souvent changé de nom, néanmoins. Le promontoire s'est appelé Mons Calpe, Notre-Dame-du-Roc, Djebel Tarik (Gibraltar)

qui se dressait alors en l'air, « presque aussi grand que le reste du corps ». À l'origine, donc, les colonnes phalliques de l'Inde, énormes formations, piliers, tours, plus larges

Deuxième passage: la colonne phallique de l'Inde. L'Esthétique en décrit la forme au chapitre de l'Architecture indépendante ou symbolique. Elle se serait propagée vers la Phrygie, la Syrie, la Grèce où, au cours des fêtes dionysiaques, selon Hérodote cité par Hegel, les femmes tiraient le fil d'un phallus

L'autre — laisse tomber le reste. Risquant de revenir au même. Tombe — deux fois les colonnes, les tombes — reste.

Peut-être le cas (*Fall*) du seing.

Si *Fall* marque le cas, la chute, la décadence, la faillite ou la fente, *Falle* égale piège, trappe, collet, la machine à vous prendre par le cou.

Le seing tombe.

Le reste est indicible, ou presque : non par approximation empirique mais à la rigueur indécidable.

« Catachrèse, s.f. 1. Trope par lequel un mot détourné de son sens propre est accepté dans le langage commun pour désigner une autre chose qui a quelque analogie avec l'objet qu'il exprimait d'abord; par exemple, une langue, parce que la langue est le principal organe de la parole articulée: une glace [...] une feuille de papier [...]. C'est aussi par catachrèse qu'on dit : ferré d'argent; aller à cheval sur un bâton, [...]. 2. Terme de musique. Dissonance dure et inusitée. E. Καταχρησμός, abus, de κατά, contre, et χρησις, usage.

Catapulte, s.m. Estrade élevée, par honneur, au milieu d'une église, pour recevoir le carnuel ou la représentation d'un mort [...]. E. Ital. catapulto: bas-lat. catapultus, catapultus, catapultus. Cato est selon Du Cange le bas-latin cotus, machine de guerre appelée chat d'après l'animal; et selon Diez cotare, voir, regarder; du reste, finalement, ces deux étymologies se confondent, vu que cotus, chat, et cotare, regarder, ont le même radical. Reste falco, qui, vu les variantes du bas-latin où le p se montre, ne peut être que le mot germanique balk (voy. balcon). Catapulte est le même mot que échafaud (voy. ce mot).

Catagolisme, s.m. Terme de littérature ancienne. Emploi de mots recherchés. E. Καταβολή, de κατά, indiquant recherche, et βάλλω, mot, langue (voy. glose). » Littér. Les ALC sonnent, cliquent, éclatent, se réfléchissent et se retournent dans tous les sens, comptent et se décomptent, ouvrant — ici — dans la pierre de chaque colonne des sortas de judas incrustés, créneaux, jalousies, meurtrières pour voir à ne pas se laisser emprisonner dans le colosse, tatouages dans la peau plissée d'un corps

feint. Some of the mechanisms of this signifying frustration include:

1. *Syntax*. Derrida's grammar is often "unspeakable"—i.e., it conforms to the laws of writing but not necessarily to the cadences of speech. Ambiguity is rampant. Parentheses go on for pages. A sentence beginning

on p. 319 does not end until p. 323, having embraced two pages of *Un Coup de dés* and a long quotation from Robert Greer Cohn. Punctuation arrests without necessarily clarifying.

2. *Allusions*. The pluralization of writing's references and voices often entails the mobilization of unnamed sources and addressees. All references to castration, lack, talking truth, and letters not reaching their destination, for example, are part of Derrida's ongoing critique of the writings of Jacques Lacan.

3. *Fading in and out*. The beginnings and endings of these essays are often the most mystifying parts. Sometimes, as in the description of Plato working after hours in his pharmacy, they are also cryptically literary, almost lyrical. It is as though the borderlines of the text had to be made to bear the mark of the silence—and the pathos—that lie beyond its fringes, as if the text had first and last to more actively disconnect itself from the logos toward which it still aspires.

4. *Multiple coherences*. The unit of coherence here is not necessarily the sentence, the word, the paragraph, or even the essay. Different threads of *Dissemination* are woven together through the bindings of grammar (the future perfect), "theme" (stones, columns, folds, caves, beds, textiles, seeds, etc.), letters (*or, d, î*), anagrammatical plays (graft/graph, semen/semantics, *lit/lire*), etc.

5. *Nonbinary logic*. In its deconstruction of the either/or logic of noncontradiction that underlies Western metaphysics, Derrida's writing attempts to elaborate an "other" logic. As he puts it in *Positions*:

Barbara Johnson, "Translator's Introduction",
Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination* (xvi-xvii)

You know that I love words. I have the greatest desire to express myself in words. For me it involves desire and the body; in my case the relation of the body to words is as important as it is with painting. That is my story, the history of my investments and drives. I am often reproached: “You only like words, it is only your lexicon that interests you.” What I do with words is make them explode so that the nonverbal appears in the verbal. That is to say that I make the words function in such a way that at a certain moment they no longer belong to discourse, to what regulates discourse – hence the homonyms, the fragmented words, the proper names that do not essentially belong to language. By treating words as proper names, one disrupts the usual order of discourse, the authority of discursivity. And if I love words it is also because of their ability to escape their proper form, whether they interest me as visible things, letters representing the spatial visibility of the word, or as something musical or audible. That is to say, I am also interested in words, paradoxically, to the extent that they are nondiscursive, for that’s how they can be used to explode discourse. That is what happens in the texts to which you allude: Not always, but in most of my texts there is a point at which the word functions in a nondiscursive manner. All of a sudden it disrupts the order and rules, but not thanks to me. I pay attention to the power that words, and sometimes the syntactical possibilities as well, have to disrupt the normal usage of discourse, the lexicon and syntax.

It is when words start to go crazy in that way and no longer behave properly in regard to discourse that they have more rapport with the other arts, and conversely this reveals how the apparently nondiscursive arts such as photography and painting correspond to a linguistic scene.

Jacques Derrida, “The Spatial Arts”
(interview with Peter Brunette and David Wills)

That gesture consists of finding, or in any case looking for, whatever in the work represents its force of resistance to philosophical authority, and to philosophical discourse on it.

Resistance to logocentrism has a better chance of appearing in these types of art [the “visual arts”].

... we can always refer to the experience that we as speaking beings ... have of these silent works, for we can always receive them, read them, or interpret them as potential discourse. That is to say, these silent works are in fact already talkative, full of virtual discourses, and from that point of view the silent work becomes an even more authoritarian discourse – it becomes the very place of a word that is all the more powerful because it is silent, and that carries within it, as does an aphorism, a discursive virtuality that is infinitely authoritarian, in a sense theologically authoritarian. Thus it can be said that the very authority that will try and in some way to capitalize on, in the first place, the infinite power of a virtual discourse – there is always more to say, and it is we who make it speak more and more – and, in the second place, the effect of an untouchable, monumental, inaccessible presence – in the case of architecture this presence is almost indestructible, or in any case mimes indestructibility, giving the overpowering effect of a speaking presence.

Now, because there cannot be anything, and in particular any art, that isn't textualized in the sense I give to the word “text” – which goes beyond the purely discursive – there is text as soon as deconstruction is engaged in fields said to be artistic, visual or spatial. There is text because there is always a little discourse somewhere in the visual arts, and also because even if there is no discourse, the effect of spacing already implies a textualization.

Jacques Derrida, “The Spatial Arts”
(interview with Peter Brunette and David Wills)

Derrida is thus ‘taking support’ on the necessary absence of the addressee in writing (one can write, by definition, only to an absent person), to reverse completely the usual conception (“philosophical”, in fact “metaphysical”) of writing, arguing that all communication is essentially “writing”, because ultimately the absence of the addressee plays in any case the same role as in writing. If indeed we decide to call “writing” this form of communication in which the addressee is absent, Derrida’s thesis consists in arguing (or to remark) that in reality there is always necessarily “writing” (or absence) in any form of communication, even in the appearance of co-presence. Therefore, the model of any communication is indeed according to him communication in absence, that is to say writing, from which would depend upon, paradoxically, oral communication. It is this model that Derrida calls *arch-writing*.

The thesis can be accepted, one can notice, only on the condition of accepting also that all communication, in spite of the appearances, is happening “in deferred”, “in absence”, including communication through speech. But this thesis is far easier to admit and understand than one may think. Who would dare arguing, indeed, after the works of the 20th century, that speech establishes a clear and translucent communication between two persons present to one another and to themselves? Derrida, arguing on the contrary that communication only happens “in absence”, is doing nothing else than drawing the most massive conclusions of psychoanalysis, of phenomenology and of the literature of his century: when we speak to another person, she is not more present to us than she is to herself: we never know exactly neither why we speak nor the exact reach of our words: consequently (...) the words we address to someone physically present are far from reaching someone really present – and presence to oneself or to another always remains fantastical (*fantasmatique*). From this the idea, finally quite natural, of considering writing, in which the absence of the addressee is visible, and even necessary, as the native (*originnaire*) model of all forms of communication.

Charles Ramond, Le Vocabulaire de Jacques Derrida


DECONSTRUCTION

Omnibus Volume

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


ZAHA HADID, OFFICE BUILDING, BERLIN, 1986

ACADEMY EDITIONS LONDON

JACQUES DERRIDA

THE TRUTH
IN PAINTING



Translated by
Geoff Bennington and
Ian McLeod



Vincent Van Gogh, *Old Shoes with Laces*

Restitutions of the truth in pointing [*pointure*]

for J.C. sztejn

“POINTURE (Latin *punctura*), sb. fem. Old synonym of prick. Term in printing, small iron blade with a point, used to fix the page to be printed on to the tympan. The hole which it makes in the paper. Term in shoemaking, glovemaking: number of stitches in a shoe or glove.”

Littré.

“I owe you the truth in painting, and I will tell it to you.”
Cézanne

“But truth is so dear to me, and so is the *seeking to make true*, that indeed I believe, I believe I would still rather be a cobbler than a musician with colors.”

Van Gogh

— And yet. Who said—I can't remember—"there are no ghosts in Van Gogh's pictures"? Well, we've got a ghost story on our hands here all right. But we should wait until there are more than two of us before we start.

— Before we get going at the double [*pour appareiller*], you mean: we should wait until there are even more than three of us.

— Here they are. I'll begin. What of shoes? What, shoes? Whose are the shoes? What are they made of? And even, who are they? Here they are, the questions, that's all.

— Are they going to remain there, put down, left lying about, abandoned [*délaissées*]? Like these apparently empty, unlaced [*dé-lacées*] shoes, waiting with a certain detachment for someone to come, and to say, to come and say what has to be done to tie them together again?

— What I mean is, there will have been something like the pairing of a correspondence between Meyer Schapiro and Martin Heidegger. And that if we take the trouble to formalize a little, that correspondence would return to the questions I've just laid down.

— It would return to them. *Returning* will have great scope [*portée*] in this debate (and so will *scope*), if, that is, it's a matter of knowing to whom and to what certain shoes, and perhaps shoes

in general, *return*. To whom and to what, in consequence, one would have to *restitute* them, render them, to discharge a debt.

— Why always say of painting that it renders, that it restitutes?

— to discharge a more or less ghostly debt, *restitute* the shoes, render them to their rightful owner; if it's a matter of knowing from where they *return*, from the city (Schapiro) or the fields (Heidegger), like rats, which I suddenly have an idea they look like (then who is these rats' Rat Man?), unless it is rather that they look like snares [*pieges à lacets*] lying in wait for the stroller in the middle of the museum (will s/he be able to avoid being in too much of a hurry and catching his/her feet in them?); if it's a question of knowing what revenue is still produced by their out-of-service dereliction, what surplus value is unleashed by the annulment of their use value: *outside* the picture, inside the *picture*, and, third, as a picture, or to put it very equivocally, *in their*

painting truth; if it's a question of knowing what ghost's step [*quel pas de revenant*], city dweller or peasant, still comes to haunt them ("the ghost of my other I," the other I of Vincent the signatory, as Schapiro suggests quoting Knut Hamsun—but Heidegger also does this, elsewhere); if it's a question of knowing whether the shoes in question are haunted by some ghost or are ghosting/returning [*la revenance*] itself (but then what are, who are in truth, and whose and what's, these things?). In short, what does it all come down to [*ça revient à quoi*]? To whom? To whom and to what are we to *restitute*, to reattach, to readjust precisely

— to what shoe size exactly, made to measure, adequately

— and where from? How? If at least it's a question of knowing, returning will be from long range [*d'une longue portée*].

What I'm saying is that there will have been a correspondence between Meyer Schapiro and Martin Heidegger.

One of them says in 1935: that pair comes back to/belongs to/amounts to the peasant, and even the peasant woman

— what makes him so sure that they are a *pair of shoes*? What is a pair?

OUVERTURE!

discourses in art works?
resistances to hegemonic discourses?

Derrida and Indian art/art in India?

how do you *write*?
writing: just one trace amongst others?
responding *in art*?

APPENDIX

N.P.: There is no difference without repetition...

J.D.: Of course, of course, some repetition, some kind of repetition. But the choice is not between repetition and innovation, but between two forms of repetition and two forms of invention. So I think there are inventive forms of respecting the tradition, and there are reactive or non-inventive forms. But I would not say that in order to invent something new, or to make something new happen, you have to betray the tradition or to forget the tradition. If I may say something about the way I try to work within the French tradition, I have the feeling that the more I understand from within a poet or a writer, the more I am able to, let us say reproduce what he is doing, the more I am able to write something else, or to counter-sign. That is, to sign another text which encounters the generic text. When I write on authors such as Genet, I don't write like them, I try to incorporate what they give me in order to perform something else which bears my own signature - which is not simply mine but which is another signature. And this happens not only in philosophy or literary theory; it happens all the time. To speak with someone else, you have to understand what the Other says, you have to be able to repeat it - that's what understanding means - and to be able to answer, to respond, and your response will be different, it will be something else, and the response includes the possibility of understanding what you're responding to. So I would put all this in terms of response - and responsibility - towards your heritage.

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I can only do my best, just adding a sentence to my first sentence, and to go on speaking trying to neutralize the misunderstandings. But you can't control everything, and the fact that you cannot control everything doesn't mean simply that you're a finite being and a limited person. It has to do with the structure of language, the structure of the trace. As soon as you trace something, the trace becomes independent of its source – that's the structure of the trace. The trace becomes independent of its origin, and as soon as the trace is traced, it escapes. You cannot control the fate of the book totally. I can't control the future of this interview (laughter)... You record it, but then you'll re-write it, re-frame it, build a new context, and perhaps, my sentence will sound different. So, I trust you but I know that it is impossible to control the publication of everything I say.

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